Tuesday, January 16, 2007

A Big Payday for Disney CEO Iger-- Who Cares?


Accounting fraud and executive peccadilloes aside, there are few business activities the news media—including us—delights in exposing as much as excessive executive compensation. Add Disney (DIS-$35.21) CEO Bob Iger’s just announced $24.9 million pay package for fiscal year ended September 2006 to that growing list.

According to its Proxy, filed late on Friday, the entertainment-media conglomerate revealed that Messer. Iger’s compensation included $2 million in salary, a $15 million cash bonus, and a $4.3 million payout from the vesting of performance options. Messer. Iger also received $666,000 expense reimbursements for auto benefits ($14,400), personal air travel ($67,879), and security ($578,656); and, $2.92 million in Disney stock options granted (exercise price – $24.87 per share) during the company's fiscal year, ended Sept. 30.

Prior to taking over from Mike Eisner in October 2005, Iger was Disney’s President and COO. He received $9.24 million in salary and cash bonus, $500,000 in restricted stock, 274,241 stock options, and other compensation of $1.02 million.

In setting the target bonus for Iger, the Compensation Committee heavily weighted his bonus to the Company’s actual performance against each of the performance goals established at the outset of the year. Performance goals for fiscal 2006 bonuses were based upon the following four corporate financial measures: operating income; free cash flow; economic profit (net operating profit after tax, minus a charge for capital employed in the business, based on the cost of capital); and, earnings per share.

Since taking over as CEO, Bob Iger has overseen a reinvigorated House of Mouse with the purchase of the Pixar animation studio, a deal with Apple, Inc.’s iTunes to make available content available for download, and a 33% and 50% rise in profits and share price, respectively.

Is Iger worth the $25 million payout? Academics, stakeholders, and policymakers will debate this question ad nauseam.

Ideally, what the 10Q Detective would like to find out is, with multi-million dollar paydays making headlines ad infinitum, does the press exposure make any difference—in influencing Boards to change their pay practices?

According to researchers at The Stanford Graduate School of Management (February 2006),
the answer is a resounding NO! The researchers concluded that there was little evidence that companies changed their compensation practices in response to harsh criticism by the press:

  • “Part of the reason that publication of negative articles about executive pay appears to have little effect may be that it actually satisfies two very different kinds of public demands. On the one hand, excessive compensation is known to be a sign of poor governance—clearly an important issue for shareholders, employees, suppliers, and society at large. At the same time, multimillion-dollar pay packages and the potential scandals surrounding the wealthy individuals who receive this kind of pay can be very entertaining. For example, there were repeated references in the press coverage of Tyco International CEO Dennis Kozlowski’s excessive pay to the $6,000 shower curtain he had purchased for his corporate apartment.”

A leading expert on corporate governance, Charles Elson, the Director of the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware, postulates a counterintuitive argument on public disclosure:

“There's one theory out there that disclosure may cause greater embarrassment and the greater the embarrassment the less likely it is that someone will overreach. That's based on the assumption that anyone who is a CEO and overreaches is capable of embarrassment. Frankly, anyone who demands those kinds of salaries is incapable of embarrassment.”

In terms of its impact on executive compensation, albeit better transparency is not sufficient in of itself to temper Board governance, in our view, when journalists report on annual pay packages, they need to do more digging—find the additional awards buried in the footnotes—to buttress—often inflammatory—headlines of excessive executive pay.

For example, are stakeholders aware that in ‘under-performing’ years, Mr. Iger is exempt from performance-linked target bonuses? Pursuant to his
Employment Agreement, dated as of October 2, 2005, Iger was not to receive a target cash bonus of no less than $7.25 million.

The Board insists the “minimum annual bonus and long-term incentive award opportunities do not guarantee Mr. Iger any minimum amount of compensation.”

Huh? Ignoring anemic share and financial performance in 2005, Iger still received a ‘non-guaranteed’ cash bonus of $7.7 million.

The value of unexercised in-the-money options that Iger holds, exercisable and unexercisable was valued at an additional $14.4 million and $7.1 million, respectively (as of 9/30/06).

Then there is the issue of ‘phantom pay’—awards granted but not yet earned. The Compensation Committee granted to Iger in 2006 an unrecorded ‘bonus’ of about $17.8 million [Since this stock does not vest until future years (September 2007 – September 2009), the aggregate 714,000 in long-term performance shares went unreported in the press. Prior to vesting, however, dividends distributed on these shares result in credits of additional performance-based restricted stock units that will be distributed when the related units vest].

At fiscal year ended 2006, Iger held—in aggregate—performance based (1,017,509) and bonus related (20,108) stock, valued at $36.5 million (equal to $35.21, the closing price on the NYSE on January 11, 2007).

On December 22, 2006, the SEC amended—simplified—
executive stock option disclosures. The new rule changes the way grants of stock options will be measured in the proxy’s summary table—raising protestations from share activists.

Under the old rule, if a company awarded an options grant valued at $20 million to an executive in 2007, the full amount of $20 million would show up in the summary compensation table.

The new rule, now in effect, says if the grants vest over five years, the amount reflected in the 2007 table would be $5.0 million, with the remaining part of the $20 million included in later years, as the executive qualifies to exercise the options.

“I can’t give you brains, but I can give you a diploma.” – The Wizard of Oz to the Scarecrow

Editor David J Phillips does not hold financial interests in any of the companies mentioned in this posting. The 10Q Detective has a Full Disclosure policy.

Saturday, January 13, 2007

Apple, DreamWorks, and Yahoo! One-Dollar A Year CEOs?



The following headline piqued our curiousity: $1 a year salary CEO: Good for Stocks? The author of the posting speculated that aligning pay practice in step with stock price performance provides a sufficient incentive to the CEO to execute the financial stewardship necessary for shareholder value creation.

In support of this argument, the author then went on to analyze “the returns of six of these ‘dollar a year stocks’ for 2006"; it turns out that they were all up, with the exception of Yahoo (YHOO), and, according to the blogger, "if you exclude Yahoo from the list, the average return for the group was up 14%, higher than the return for the NASDAQ at 8 percent and the S&P 500 at 12 percent."

Aside from the statistical problem inherent in making inferences about stock performance from a finite population of six CEOs,when the 10Q Detective did its Due Diligence, we found that the purported one-dollar a year CEO was more myth than reality:


  • Apple, Inc. (APPL)/ 13 percent/ CoFounder & CEO Steve Jobs. His current salary at Apple officially remains $1 per year, although he has traditionally been the recepient of a number of lucrative executive perquisites approved by the Board, including a $46 million Gulfstream jet in 2001 and just under 30 million shares of restricted stock in 2000-2002.

In 2003, Apple granted Messer. Jobs an additional 10 million shares (now fully vested). Oh, and remember that Gulfstream? In March 2002, the Company entered into a Reimbursement Agreement with Jobs for the reimbursement of expenses “incurred by Mr. Jobs in the operation of his private plane when used for Apple business.” During 2005, the Company recognized a total of $1,075,545 in expenses pursuant to this reimbursement agreement related to expenses incurred by Mr. Jobs (in 2005).

Steve Jobs also served as CEO of Pixar, the computer animation studio behind such animated feature films as Toy Story, Monster’s Inc., and Finding Nemo. On January 24, 2006, the House of Mouse agreed to purchase the studio, in an all-stock transaction worth $7.4 billion.

Accordingly, at the effective time of the merger, the 60.0 million share of Pixar common stock held by Mr. Jobs were converted into 138 million shares of Disney, making Jobs the largest individual shareholder, with approximately 6.3% of the outstanding shares.

Steve Jobs was ranked 49th on Forbes 400 Richest (2006), with a net worth in excess of $4.9 billion. [Ed. Note As the price of Apple shares have effectively doubled in value in the last year, Jobs’s estimated net worth is north of $5.4 billion.].

Job’s is well-compensated for someone whose salary at Apple officially remains one-dollar per year.

  • DreamWorks Animation SKG (DWA)/ 18 percent / CoFounder Jeff Katzenberg has served as CEO since October 2004. The animation studio, creator of hits like Madagascar, Shrek, and Shark Tale, revealed in its last Proxy Statement that Mr. Katzenberg’s annual salary is one-dollar per annum, although he did accept $17.7 million in performance (restricted) stock units and options in 2004 (which means he “earned” $5.9 million per annum, for 2003 – 2005, not $1.00 per year)!

Mr. Katzenenberg beneficially owns 36.4 million (of Class A & Class B) shares, worth an estimated $109.2 million. In addition, 618,571 shares of Class A restricted stock with performance-based vesting conditions granted to Mr. Katzenberg at the time of its October 2004 IPO will vest in the first quarter of 2009. As of January 12, 2007, these shares had a value of $18.53 million (based on $29.96 per share, the closing price of DreamWorks Animation’s Class A Stock on the NYSE on such date).

In December 2005, Messer. Katzenberg entered into an agreement at his initiative and request, which waived equity awards—in aggregate $13.0 million-- he would otherwise have been entitled to receive under his employment agreement, for the fiscal years ending December 31, 2006,2007, and 2006. Before our readers begin to believe that Messer. Katzenberg is a worthy hero right from central casting, sacrificing for the good of the many, read on:

In December 2005, DreamWorks was in financial trouble—year-over-year, sales, share-net, ROA, and the share-price had fallen 57.1%, 75.1%, 77.2%, and 33.3 percent, respectively,

Mr. Katzenberg serves on the boards of The Motion Picture and Television Fund, The Museum of Moving Image, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, California Institute of the Arts and The Simon Wiesenthal Center. He is co-chairman of each of the Creative Rights Committee of the Directors Guild of America, and the Committee on the Professional Status of Writers of the Writers Guild of America. In addition, he helps with fundraising efforts on behalf of AIDS Project Los Angeles, which provides its clients with medical and social services.

Messer. Katzenberg had to choose, his social responsibilities or stewardship of DreamWorks. He chose the former.

Katzenberg ‘voluntarily’ disavowed his future compensation to accommodate the hiring and compensation of Lewis Coleman, former CFO of Bank of America, appointed President of DreamWorks Animation on December 5, 2005.

Pursuant to his three-year employment agreement, Mr. Coleman earns an annual salary of $1.25 million. He was also awarded an initial performance grant of 82,998 shares of restricted stock.

  • Kinder Morgan (KMI)/ 16 percent/ On October 7, 1999, the Board entered into an employment agreement with co-founder Rich Kinder, pursuant to which he became Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of this energy services company. Mr. Kinder, at his initiative, accepted a salary of $1 per year to “demonstrate his belief in the long term viability” of the Company. Mr. Kinder has periodically renewed this one-dollar per year pledge.

KMI owns the general partner interest of Kinder Morgan Energy Partners ((KMP), one of the largest publicly traded pipeline limited partnerships in the United States. This an energy storage and transportation company operates either for itself or on behalf of Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., approximately 43,000 miles of refined petroleum product pipelines and approximately 150 terminals. Combined, the companies have an enterprise value of more than $35 billion.

Although this poster boy for “prudent’ executive compensation pays himself only one-dollar a year, he did earn $85.0 million in corporate dividends last year.

Rich Kinder, 62, ranked #98 on Forbes 400 Richest Americans list (2006), with a net worth in excess of $2.8 billion, is leading an investor group in a $15 Billion Buyout Offer (107.50 a share in cash).

[Ed. note. Prior to the announced deal, KMI stock was trading at $83.00 per share, down $8.00, or 8.8% year-to date.]

  • Yahoo! (YHOO) / -(38) percent/ Given the precipitious decline in the share price of online service provider Yahoo! Chairman & CEO Terry Semel ‘voluntarily’ reduced his annual salary from $600,000 per annum to one-dollar. No word, however, if Messer. Semel is willing to forego any of the $19.2 million he received in long-term compensation (in 2005 and 2004 –stock options and performance stock units).

Do not be fooled by Semel’s seeming humility; for, including exercisable stock options, Semel beneficially owns about 18.4 million, or 1.3%, of Yahoo!’s stock, worth an estimated $541.9 million.

And, on May 31, 2006, as an “incentive” to sign this highly touted one-dollar employment agreement, the Board granted Mr. Semel a stock option to purchase 6 million shares of the Company's common stock at a per share exercise price of $31.59 (the closing trading price that day).

For each of 2006 through 2008, too, Mr. Semel will also be eligible to receive a discretionary annual bonus payable in the form of a fully vested non-qualified stock option for up to 1 million shares with an exercise price equal to the closing trading price of the Company's common stock on the date of the to-be issued grant(s).

“The big print giveth and the small print taketh away” – Tom Waits, American singer-songwriter

Editor David J Phillips does not hold financial interests in any of the companies mentioned in this posting. The 10Q Detective has a Full Disclosure policy.

Wednesday, January 10, 2007

Sirius Satellite: Reverse Stock Split in the Offing?


On Tuesday, digital radio programmer Sirius Satellite (SIRI-$3.71) said it had paid its on-air personality Howard Stern an $83 million stock-based performance bonus, which was tied to subscriber targets set when Stern signed a $500 million contract with the Company in October 2004.

Commenting on the shock jock’s earn-out, management said the bonus to Stern would not increase its diluted share count and that expenses related to the payment have been reflected in operating results throughout 2006. [Ed. note. SIRIUS recognized a non-cash expense associated with these shares of $224.8 million during the nine months ended September 30, 2006.]

For the nine-months ended September 30, 2006, Sirius recorded a net loss of $(859.3) million, or a share-net loss of 61 cents, on $443.8 million in revenue.

The Company’s remarks, however, betray the truth.

The similarity between 1924 Germany and present-day SIRIUS should be cause for concern to SIRIUS stockholders.

In 1922, the highest denomination in post-war Germany was 50,000 mark. By 1924 the denomination had increased more than 20,000-fold. [Forgive us for hyperbole] From 2000 to 2006, the number of shares of common stock outstanding of SIRIUS has increased 50-fold [balance on January 1, 2000, was 28.7 million shares].

Like the the Weimar Republic of Germany issuing fifty-million-mark banknotes and postage stamps with a face value of fifty billion mark, Sirius’ growth model is predicated on the calculus that to fund its OEM distribution channel and content library—to attract new subscribers—all the Company need do is issue more-and-more—in their case, the currency of choice is common stock and/or warrants.

Changing the way people listen to music, sports, news, and entertainment does not come cheap. SIRIUS is authorized to issue 2.5 BILLION shares of its common stock. As of September 30, 2006, the Company had about 1.4 billion shares outstanding (with total stockholder deficit of $200.3 million).

In addition, as of Dec 31, 2006, the Board is currently authorized to issue, without stockholder approval, up to approximately 620 million additional shares of common stock, reserved for issuance in connection with outstanding convertible debt, warrants, incentive stock plans and common stock (to be granted to third parties upon satisfaction of performance targets).

Editor David J Phillips is now posting one day a week at Investor-Advantage. Please stop by for a visit to read this article in its entirety.

Tuesday, January 09, 2007

Fording Canadian Coal: Post-Christmas Stocking Stuffer


Fording Canadian Coal Trust (FDG-$19.95) is a royalty trust. The Trust, through its subsidiaries, holds a 46 percent interest in Neptune Bulk Terminals (Canada) Ltd. and a 60% interest in the Elk Valley Coal Partnership, which currently operates six Canadian mines in British Columbia and Alberta.

Elk Valley Coal’s operations employ conventional
open pit mining techniques using primarily truck and shovel methods The majority of coal mined and processed at the Company’s operations is metallurgical hard coking coal for the global steel industry. Responsible for about one sixth of the global seaborne market supply, Elk Valley Coal is the second-largest supplier of its product in the world.

The Elk Valley Coal Partnership accounts for about 98 percent of the Trust's revenues.

Financial Highlights

For the nine-months ended September 30, 2006,
net income from operations increased 5 percent from 2005 to $535 million, due to higher coal sales prices. Revenue increased 6 percent to $1.4 billion as average US dollar coal prices were up 25%, offset to some degree by lower sales volumes and a stronger Canadian dollar.

Challenges in coming quarters for Fording include lower average coal prices, new mines coming online from competitors, and global markets being flooded with coal of lesser quality.
Elk Valley’s average 2006 coal year prices for the period April 1, 2006, to March 31, 2007, across all coal products is expected to be approximately US$107 per ton compared with US$122 per ton for the 2005 coal year.

Elk Valley has entered into the early stage of volume and price negotiations for the coal year commencing April 1, 2007. High prices for hard coking coal have resulted in integrated steel mills using less hard coking coal to the extent their processes permit. While global steel production is at high levels, demand for hard coking coal is being adversely affected by the historically wide premium that is being charged for hard coking coals over prices for coals of lesser quality. This premium is encouraging the substitution by some integrated steel mills of lower quality—lower priced—coals at the expense of hard coking coals (which management blames for the 8 percent year-over-year decline in sales volumes).

The fundamental driver of hard coking pricing remains the supply-demand balance. The weekly mining letter,
Creamer Media, says that the global integrated steel-mill production determines coking-coal demand. Global production of hot metal from blast furnaces is forecasted to grow from the current level of 700-million tons a year to 932-million tons a year by 2009, driven by Asian demand, with India and China the main contributors.

Competition

New sources of hard coking coal from competitors in Australia and Canada are coming on line, and will continue to do so over the next two or three years. While the projects are not large individually, they will add a significant amount of supply on a cumulative basis. Infrastructure constraints in Australia are being mitigated and additional capacity is being added to port and rail facilities.

Citigroup global commodity analyst Alan Heap says that the global supply and demand balance for coking coal is expected to see supply steadily rise to a peak in 2008 and fall back to a small surplus in 2009, with pricing easing to $100/ton next year.

Other commodity analysts suspect that future additional supply will pressure pricing further, with the current average price of $115 per ton drifting down to $75/ton by 2009.

Declining sales volumes + the
tax fairness plan announced Oct. 31 by Canadian Finance Minister Jim Flaherty + shared sympathy with thermal coal mining/commodity companies (weakening energy prices) — all these factors contributed to the 44 percent drop in the share price of Fording in the last year.

Valuation Analysis

A share price selling for just 8.3 times 2007 earnings of $2.42, which is below both the Company’s four-year average of 11.9 times and the coal industry P/E 2007 (est.) of 12.2 times; an Enterprise Value/EBITDA (TTM) at a 53.8% discount to peer comparables (diversified metallurgical/thermal producers), 4.2 times vs. 9.1 times, respectively; and, an estimated forward annual dividend yield of about 11.5% (assuming a payout ratio of 95 percent) — the current valuation of Fording is unjustified, and presents a compelling inflection point for purchase.

A recent Associated Press story trumpeted, “
Warm Winter Weather Hurting Shares of Arch Coal and Other Coal Miners.” As previously mentioned, no more than two percent of the Company’s top-line growth is derived from thermal coal.

The 10Q Detective has used the protracted weakness (because of bearish sentiment for steam coal companies) to buy 300 shares of Fording stock for our Model Portfolio.

Editor David J Phillips holds financial interests in several Canadian royalty income trusts, including Fording Canadian Coal Trust. The 10Q Detective has a Full Disclosure policy.

Friday, January 05, 2007

10Q Detective Portfolio at a Glance: January 2007


Our objective is to see if an investment of $50,000 in the 10Q_Stock Portfolio at the start of 2007 can outpace (any) gains of total shareholder returns of most stock indices, including the venerable Standard & Poor's 500 Composite Stock Price Index at year-end through price appreciation and dividends reinvested.




CLOSED POSITIONS
PositionPurchase
Date
PriceCostSale
Date
PriceProceeds% Change
10008/18/06$33.983,410.9912/14/06$33.243,321.01(2.64)%
10009/07/06$31.55 3,167.9912/14/06$33.243,319.004.77%
10009/25/06$27.532,765.9912/14/06$33.243,319.0019.99%
300 Shares of Halliburton Co. (HAL)
TOTAL: $9,344.97$9,959.016.57%
Dividends:$30.00
TOTAL RETURN6.89%


Long Positions in 10Q Detective Portfolio, January 01, 2007:
SymbolPositionYear-End
Value
% Total
STOCK(s) TOTAL: $35,941
BBC1300$6,63013.26
Money MKT:$14,059
CHNG1000$3,1506.30
PDS 600$13,89627.79
TOTAL VALUE:$50,000
PGH500$8,60517.21
NTO1000$3,6607.32

The opinions expressed herein are subject to change without notice. Neither the information nor any opinion expressed herein constitutes a solicitation by us of the purchase or sale of any securities. Blue Sky Enterprises, LLC., its affiliates, and/or their officers and employers may from time to time acquire, hold, or sell a position in the securities mentioned herein. Upon receipt of queries, specific information in this regard will be furnished.

Copyright © 2007 Blue Sky Enterprises, LLC. No part of the material may be reproduced or transmitted by any process in whole or in part without prior permission in writing.

Wednesday, January 03, 2007

Hedge Fund Remodeling Griffin Corp?


Hedge Fund operator Clinton Group, which beneficially owns about 5.2% in Griffon Corp. (GFF-$25.50), recently delivered a letter to the maker of everything from garage doors to specialty plastic films used in baby diapers, adult incontinence, and other products, stating its belief that the “market price of the Shares failed to reflect the stand-alone value of the Company’s operating subsidiaries.” The letter also advised Griffon’s management that they should evaluate multiple strategic alternatives to enhance shareholder value, including, but not limited to, a tax-free spin-off, a sale of one or more subsidiaries, or a going-private transaction.

There is appeal to the Clinton Group’s argument, for Griffin might be too diversified in its manufacturing operations:
  1. Garage Doors—selling to the residential housing and commercial building markets;
  2. Installation Services—servicing the new residential housing market with an array of building related products, ranging from garage doors, manufactured fireplaces, floor coverings, and cabinetry;
  3. Specialty Plastic Films—the maker of plastic and film laminates for use in infant diapers, adult incontinence products, feminine hygiene products and disposable surgical and patient care products;
  4. Electronic Information and Communication Systems—selling airborne maritime surveillance and aircraft intercommunication management systems for defense and commercial markets.

Financials

Net sales for the year ended September 30, 2006 increased 17.1% to $1.64 billion. Net income was $51.8 million, or share-net of $1.65, compared with $48.8 million, or $1.55 per share, last year.

Garage Doors represent one out of every three dollars in sales and 38.9% of operating profits. The Company estimates that the majority of Garage Doors’ net sales are from sales of garage doors to the home remodeling segment of the residential housing market, with the balance from the new residential housing and commercial building markets. Driving growth in this $2.2 billion market is the shift from wood to steel doors.

[Ed. note. Griffin did not breakdown how much of this segment’s total revenues are generated through its aftermarket service operations—which of itself would provide the division with a stable revenue base during economic downturns.]

Over the past decade, an increasing number of garage doors have been sold through home center retail chains. The Company estimates that approximately 35% of its
garage doors are sold through this retail channel of distribution. The segment’s largest customers are The Home Depot, Inc. and Menards, Inc.

In FY ’06, Griffin invested approximately $22 million in equipment and plant expenditures to support future growth in this segment.

With respect to the overall outlook for garage doors, management is cautiously optimistic. Despite weaker housing markets, Griffin benefited from a shift in customer demand to more premium doors, a trend that should contribute to future revenue and margin growth.

The Installation Services segment provides installed specialty-building products primarily to residential builders. In a fragmented market, characterized by small operations offering a single type of building product in a single market, management believes it has the economies of scale and scope that small and national builders (alike) find convenient.

Sales by Installation Services have provided approximately 21 percent and 8.7% of the Company’s consolidated revenue and operating profit in 2006, respectively.

Management expects that fiscal 2007 sales will be below 2006 levels due to weaker housing markets and the loss of certain customers in the segment’s Las Vegas market, offset by attractive interest rates on home equity financing driving demand for retail remodeling projects.
Still, even in a hot construction market back in 2004, this segment contributed only 8.6% to operating profit. Might the Company be too diversified in trying to satisfy the scope of builders’ demands? Granted, this segment installs and services the Garage Door’s sales; nonetheless, find the lower-margin product lines and ditch them!

Specialty Plastic Films are primarily used as moisture barriers in disposable infant diapers, adult incontinence products and feminine hygiene products, as protective barriers in single-use surgical and industrial gowns, drapes and equipment covers, and as packaging for hygienic products.

The segment’s major customer is Procter & Gamble (59 percent of specialty film’s sales), with whom the company supplies products used primarily for its infant diapers, both domestically and internationally. Design changes by Procter & Gamble for its infant diaper products have resulted in a change in products produced by the company from laminates to narrower and thinner gauged printed film. As a result, the volume of film products sold by the segment for this customer has declined.

Looking to expand its market presence, in FY ’06, Griffin spent approximately $11 million in equipment, research (in new advanced products such as cloth-like, breathable, laminated, and printed products), and in manufacturing capacity (such as a new manufacturing facility near São Paulo, Brazil).

Resin price increases had an unfavorable impact on operating income of approximately $7 million for the year. According to management, resin prices have been weaker and they believe that fiscal 2007 prices will be flat to slightly favorable.

Sales by Specialty Plastic Films provided approximately 23 percent and 8.7% of the Company’s consolidated revenue and operating profit in 2006, respectively, from 30 percent and 8.7% in 2004, respectively.

In our view, the sale of this division would be welcomed by existing shareholders, for as management itself says, “There can be no assurance that the capital expansion program that we have implemented in the specialty plastic films segment will generate the revenue and profits anticipated.”

Electronic Information and Communication Systems are sold through its
Telephonics Corp. subsidiary. Telephonics is generally a first tier supplier to prime contractors in the defense industry, with Boeing and Lockheed Martin being significant customers.

This segment is growing, generating about 24 percent and 37.5% of Griffin’s net sales and operating profit in FY ’06, respectively, up from 14 percent and 16 percent, respectively, in 2004. This substantial growth was primarily attributable to the Warlock-Duke program with Syracuse Research Corp. to manufacture equipment that is designed to defeat roadside bomb threats.

The Clinton Group is targeting this segment for a possible spinoff (to unlock its intrinsic value).

Corporate Governance

Readers will note that an LBO would probably get the thumbs up signal from its CEO, Harvey R. Blau. Irrespective as to whether or not his employment is terminated upon a “Change-in-Control” at Griffin (defined as the acquisition of 35% of the voting power of the Company), he shall automatically be entitled to a lump sum payment of approximately $7.63 million (excluding the gains from stock currently held and/or restricted stock units).

In the year that a Change-in-Control occurs, Blau would also be entitled to an additional bonus (which would mirror the then current fiscal year before the Change in Control), based upon performance for that portion of the year. For example, if Griffin were bought on July 1, 2007, he would receive three-quarters of his FY ‘06 (ending September 30) bonus of $4.1 million, or approximately $3.08 million.

[Ed. note. Despite Return on Assets falling from 7.5% (2004) to 5.8% in 2006, the Board still felt that Blau had “earned” his $4.1 million and $4.09 million in cash bonuses paid out to him in 2005 and 2006, respectively. The Company’s Senior Management Incentive Plan provides for an annual bonus to Mr. Blau based upon company performance—defined as Griffin’s consolidated pretax earnings: For each fiscal year. Mr. Blau's annual bonus equals 4 percent of the first $5,000,000 of consolidated pretax earnings, plus 5% of the amount of consolidated pretax earnings in excess of $5,000,000.]

In addition, Griffin would provide Messer. Blau with a tax gross-up payment to cover any excise tax due on the $10.71 million!

Mr. Blau acquired 660,000 shares on exercise in FY ’06, with a realized value of $10.1 million. He also owns exercisable in-the-money stock options worth an estimated $25.4 million

In our view, it makes sense for Mr. Blau to vocally support a Change-in-Control, too, because the normal retirement age under Griffon Corporation’s Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan (GSERP) is 72. Mr. Blau will celebrate his 72nd birthday in 2007. As of November 30, 2006, Mr. Blau had 34 years of service, and has already maximized his GSERP annual benefit payment (30 years). Under the GSERP plan, Mr. Blau is entitled to receive annual benefits of $2.25 million (before the reduction of Social Security benefits).

Retirement benefits are payable for life, with a guarantee of 10 years of payments. In addition, the SERP provides a pre-retirement death benefit payable for 10 years to the participant's beneficiary. Ergo, if the Grim Reaper were to come a-calling, Mr. Blau’s beneficiary would receive $22.5 million (less already paid sums).

The new owners would also be obligated to provide Mr. Blau, 71, with lifetime medical benefits after his termination of service. After two years—in the event that these benefits would become subject to taxes (under Section 409A)--Blau would forego such future benefits and receive instead a lump sum payment equal to the foregone economic benefit.

Valuation Analysis

Shares of Griffin sell for 12.6 times FY ’07 analysts’ estimate of $2.02 per share, a three-year low.

Segment performance is driven by industry-specific factors—which complicates matters when trying to tag the aggregate with a valuation. Shares of Griffin sell for 0.58 times enterprise value-to-revenue valuation (EV/REV), compared with EV/REV valuations of 3.3x, 0.73x, 1.15x, and 1.05x for consumer products maker Procter & Gamble, kitchen cabinet maker American Woodmark, home improvement manufacturer Masco, and defense contractor Lockheed Martin, respectively.

The due diligence conducted by the Clinton Group suggests that the fair value for Griffon's stock would approximate $31-$35 per share (adjusted for certain adjustments, such as the full conversion of outstanding convertible notes). The per share value was calculated with trading multiples of 7x – 8x, 6x – 7x, 10x – 11x, and 7.0x – 8.0x (EBITDA) for the Garage Doors, Installation Services, Defense, and Specialty Plastic Films segments, respectively.

[Ed. note. Our due diligence suggests that these peer comparables are appropriate.]

If the Clinton Group is successful in its goal of unlocking shareholder value, buying at current prices could result in a 21.5% to- 37.2% gain for new investors.

At $33.00 per share, however, Griffin would be charting at 16.3 times ’07 earnings (near the top end of its historic three-year P/E multiple).

Editor David J Phillips does not hold financial interests in any of the companies mentioned in this posting. The 10Q Detective has a Full Disclosure policy.

Tuesday, January 02, 2007

Smiles & Frowns -- Bye! Bye! 2006


Business in 2006 had Wi-Fi+ ailing U.S. carmakers and Music Labels+ Google!+ merging lines between cable and television+ plummeting LCD TV prices+ soaring economy in China+ podcasting+ Ken Lay’s death+ midterm elections.

Here at the 10Q Detective, we had our own share of smiles and frowns:

Smiles:

BioCryst Pharmaceuticals (BCRX-$11.56) – 42.4%

January 10, 2006. "Biocryst's current valuation ($20.08) is approximately $531 million. Given the Company's limited history of discovery research, no developmental infrastructure to speak of, and an unknown advantage over a litany of other companies pursuing similar therapies, we do not find the current valuation compelling. One sneeze, and this stock could surprise investors with an ugly downside surprise."

Telestone Technologies Corp. (TSTC-$8.20) – 104.5%

January 25, 2006. "Even without the inclusion of revenue generated from the upcoming 3-G deployment in China, management still expects top-line growth and share-net EPS in the order of 20%-to-30% year-over-year. We do, however, expect a big impact on revenues and profitability, assuming a 2H:06 deployment of the 3G technologies in the PRC. Our early estimates call for Telestone to show top-line of approximately $55 million, throwing of share-net of $0.50 [assuming 10 million shares, fully-diluted]. For aggressive investors willing to assume the inherent risk of owning a small-cap company, we recommend dialing up your broker and buying some shares."

Spectrum Brands, Inc. (SPC-$10.90) – 48.7%

March 29, 2006. "The Company has consistently attributed a stagnant consumer-spending environment as an additional reason for poor product sales. The 10Q Detective believes that the core weakness facing Spectrum Brands is management itself. Sorry to disappoint, but doggie-doo-doo will not bring back profitability to Spectrum Brands. AVOID/SELL."

Lifetime Brands, Inc. (LCUT-$16.43) – 43.4%

May 08, 2006. "In our opinion, the goings on at Lifetime Brands makes a mockery of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was passed to provide greater oversight and accountability of financial management. Aside from the fact that Wal-Mart is Lifetime Brands single largest customer, accounting for approximately 20% of net sales in 2005, 10Q Detective readers have been forewarned."

Frowns:

NBTY, Inc. (NTY-$41.57) – (91.4%)

February 20, 2006. "In our opinion, NBTY’s current top-line growth is just a blip on the radar—rather than a visible, direction-course change in consumer demand."

Force Protection (FRPT-$17.41) – (171.6%)

August 28, 2006. "In our opinion, Force Protection’s management does not have the know-how to be profitable as a ‘low-volume’ producer—with only two product lines, the Company is highly dependent on ramping up production for sustainable profitability. And management has yet to demonstrate its ability to leverage its core-competence by exporting its blast-resistant technology….

A turnaround at Force Protection is well underway, but lingering concerns on future contract wins will likely put a ceiling on further multiple expansion. A step-up in new product flow coupled with new contract wins—especially Humvee replacement orders—are the necessary positive catalysts for additional short-term trading gains in the price of the Common Stock….

Sales growth acceleration beyond FY 2008 is cloudier. However, industry consolidation trends bode well for shareholders….The 10Q Detective, however, prefers to stay on the sidelines—at least for now." [This is one stock story where we should have thrown caution to the wind—and done some buying! Woulda,’ Shoulda,’ Coulda.’]

Friday, December 29, 2006

Will Heelys' Stock Price Skate Higher in 2007?



On December 8, 2006, “wheels-on-a-heel" footwear designer Heelys, Inc. (HLYS-$32.74) priced 6.425 million shares at $21, a 23.5% premium to its suggested IPO price of $17.00 per share. Heelys offered 3.125 million shares of common stock and certain existing stockholders sold the remaining 3.3 million shares, with Bear Stearns and Wachovia Securities acted as co-managers for the IPO.

The Company is using the net proceeds from the IPO to repay about $22.0 million in debt outstanding, upgrade its IT systems, and to fund expansion plans, including advertising (television), staff headcount (of 38 employees), and product development.

Shares “heelied” down Wall Street, as investors bid up the stock 55.2% in its first day of trading, excited about the Company’s growth prospects in domestic and international markets

Heelys sells a dual-purpose shoe that has a removable wheel, which allows the user to seamlessly change from walking or running to skating by shifting their weight to the heel. Users can also transform HEELYS-wheeled footwear into comfortable street shoes by removing the wheel.

The footwear, sold under the marketing slogan "Freedom is a wheel in your sole," is targeted to boys and girls between six and fourteen years of age, particularly those who associate themselves with youth action sports.

The wheeled shoes, which retail from $59.99 to $99.99, come in three categories—Single-Wheel, Two-Wheel, and Grind-and-Roll, and in a variety of colors—and can be found at sporting goods retailers, specialty shoe retailers, and select department stores.

Financial Analysis

In the first nine-months of this fiscal year, net sales increased 303.1% to $117.1 million, from $29.1 million for the nine months ended September 30, 2005. Unit sales of HEELYS-wheeled footwear increased by 2.9 million pairs, or 316.2%, to 3.9 million pairs for the nine months ended September 30, 2006.

For the nine months ended September 30, 2006, 85.9% of net sales were from domestic retail customers, as compared with 81.0% for the nine months ended September 30, 2005. Domestic net sales increased $77.1 million, or 327.8%, to $100.6 million for the first nine-months.

Internationally, net sales increased $11.0 million, or 198.2%, to $16.5 million. This increase was primarily the result of increased sales to distributors in Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Argentina/Brazil/Chile, partially offset by decreased sales to distributors in Japan and Spain/Portugal.

As a percentage of net sales, net income increased to 15.1% for the nine months ended September 30, 2006, from 10.0% for the nine months ended September 30, 2005. Net income was $17.7 million, or share-net of $0.70, compared with $2.9 million, or 11 cents per share, last year. This impressive growth was due to higher sales and decreases in product costs (due to product mix and efficiencies related to the opening of a distribution center), partially offset by increased freight costs (primarily caused by airfreight costs to meet rush-past due orders).

For the nine months ended September 30, 2006, cash used in operating activities was $19.5 million compared to $316,000 for the nine months ended September 30, 2005. Cash used in operating activities for 2006 consisted primarily of an increase in net working capital of $37.5 million partially offset by net income of $17.7 million and non-cash items of $279,000. The increase in net working capital was primarily the result of an increase of $36.5 million in accounts receivable due to increased net sales and an increase in inventory of $11.3 million due to an increase in inventory in transit, partially offset by an increase in accrued expenses of $6.6 million and income taxes payable of $4.5 million related to increased income before income taxes.

The increase in net working capital was related to—similar to other vendors of footwear products—the seasonality of sales. There are three major buying seasons in footwear: spring/summer, back-to-school and holiday. Shipments—and the need for higher inventories—for back-to-school generally occur over the summer and shipments for the holiday season begin in October and finish in early December.

Investment Analysis

In our view, at $32.74, or 35 times estimates earnings of $0.94 per share, Heelys’ stock already discounts a strong fourth-quarter.

Heelys run out of the blocks comes on the heels of other strong specialty retailers and sportswear retailers (aimed at the youth market) IPOs in the last two years. Looking at these “lifestyle-trends” peer comparables, however, risk-reward does not favor establishing new positions in Heelys:

COMPANYSYMBOL/
PRICE
2007
P/E
EV/REV
(TTM)
Heelys, Inc. (HLYS)34.8x5.7
CROCS, Inc. (CROX-$43.53)21.3x5.9
Under Armour, Inc. (UA-$50.80)52.9x6.2
Zumiez, Inc. (ZUMZ-$29.52)33.2x3.05
Volcom, Inc. (VLCM-$29.30)20.1x3.30
Note. HLYS -- PE is FY '06/ Enterprise Value/ Revenue (EV/REV) based on 2006 est. of $160.3 mill.


Action & Board sports apparel retailer Volcom illustrates what happens when yellow flags begin to fly. On May 11, 2006, one of Volcom’s largest customers (accounting for about 25% of revenue), casual apparel maker Pacific Sunwear (PSUN-$19.67) announced that same-store sales and net income were lower in its 1Q:06. From May to August, PSUN shed about 30.4% in market value—and in sympathy, Volcom’s stock price dropped about 47.2% in market value!

Heely’s current stock price could look cheap, however, if management executes on its promise to increase domestic distribution by expanding the number of stores in which its wheeled footwear is sold (by existing retail customers and by adding new retail customers). If sales double in 2007 and the Company can continue to throw off net margins of 15%, Healy’s share could increase another 50% in value.

In the coming months, a boost in Heelys’ stock price could come, too, when its underwriters Bear Stearns, Wachovia Capital Markets, JPMorgan and CIBC World Markets—in all likelihood—publish positive research comments.

[Ed. note. Due to the Company’s limited funding at its public inception, management will need to focus its marketing resources on specific regions of the country that management believes will more readily embrace wheeled sports. In our view, with growth comes the need for additional capital to fund the build-out of additional distribution facilities, staffing needs, etc. The Company will probably float a secondary offering in 2007—so who wants to be lead underwriter?]

Other Investment Risks & Considerations

In 2005 and in the nine-month period ended September 30, 2006, Heelys generated approximately 95% and 99% of its net sales, respectively, from HEELYS-wheeled footwear. Management expects to continue to depend upon this single product line for substantially all of its net sales in the foreseeable future. If consumer interest in HEELYS-wheeled footwear or wheeled sports activity products in general declines, the Company would likely experience a significant loss of sales and would be forced to liquidate excess inventories at a discount, which would have a material adverse impact on its business and operations.

Vulnerability Due to Customer Concentration. For the nine months ended September 30, 2006, Journeys and The Sports Authority accounted for 11.6% and 11.0%, respectively, of net sales. Success is contingent upon the willingness and ability of these retail customers to market and sell Heelys products to consumers.

Because Heelys outsources all of its manufacturing to a small number of independent manufacturers, the Company may face challenges in maintaining a sufficient supply of products to meet future demand for its products or experience interruptions in its supply chain.

The Company has commissioned Boss Technical Services, an independent sourcing agent, to help the Company identify and develop relationships with manufacturers of its footwear products (and provides quality inspection, testing, logistics and product development and design assistance).

Manufacturer Bu Kyung Industrial-So. Korea, (owned by one of the owners of Boss Technical Services) produced almost all of HEELYS-wheeled footwear until May 2006. Commencing in May, when demand for HEELYS-wheeled footwear products outstripped the capacity of this independent manufacturer, management used additional independent manufacturers to produce HEELYS-wheeled footwear.

The company faces risks, too, from an increasing number of counterfeit shoes being sold in the U.S. For example,
a recent lawsuit against Levy Marketing accuses the company of selling knockoffs of the Heelys to ''kiosk retail outlets in various malls'' throughout the country.

As of September 30, 2006, the Company offered its products internationally through more than 30 independent distributors, each of which has exclusive rights to a designated territory. In 2005, the largest international territories by net sales were Canada, Japan and Spain/Portugal. Since 2004, no country other than the United States has accounted for 10% or more of our net sales.

Management believes that international distribution represents a meaningful growth channel for the Company, but success in developing foreign markets depends on distributors ability to establish relationships with other distributors in new international markets.

The 10Q Detective notes that the Company is having trouble penetrating shoe markets in the Far East (surprise?). For example, a Korean firm sells a one-wheel roller shoe knockoff called “Heatys.”

To defend its patents and intellectual property in the U.S., the Company has filed more than 70 patents and holds the rights to proprietary technology with names like "High-end Grind Shoe Technology" and a wheel suspension system featuring “shock-absorbing springs” in the wheel housing.

In some Asian countries where Heelys has sought patent protection, however, third parties have challenged the validity, enforceability and scope of its patent rights. For example, the Japan Patent Office issuing an opinion in February 2006 that Heely’s Japanese patent was invalid. (The Company has filed a lawsuit with the Intellectual Property High Court in Japan, in June 2006, and plans to file a Trial for Correction in the Japan Patent Office to attempt to overturn the prior opinion).

Additionally, a third party recently commenced a proceeding to invalidate Heely’s patent on the "Roller Shoe" in Taiwan.

There is also product-liability risk. According to published reports, there are Heely bans in many public buildings, malls, school hallways and playgrounds.

In addition, the Boston group World Against Toys Causing Harm Inc.
(W.A.T.C.H.) placed Heelys on the top of its annual "10 Worst Toys" list for 2006, citing safety concerns that the wheeled-sneakers are marketed to children who are unprepared for their associated risks.

[Ed. note. On its website, the Company’s disclaimer states: “recommend that anyone who attempts to use HEELYS in any capacity should ALWAYS wear full protective gear, including: helmets, wrist, elbow, and knee pads.” Yet, in a video we watched on the site called “
The Rush,” the adult skater wore none of the aforementioned safety gear!]

Look for liability insurance costs to continue to rise with sales.

One rarely mentioned risk--HEELYS-wheeled footwear could become subject to import tariffs in the United States. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection currently classifies the product(s) as a skate, and as such the Company does not pay import duties to the United States. However, many in the House and Senate are calling for trade protection—especially from countries in Asia—as our
Trade Deficits balloon (the experts say these deficits are “ capital borrowing from abroad,” approaching 7 percent of GDP.)

If the classification for HEELYS-wheeled footwear changed and HEELYS-wheeled footwear became subject to an import duty (as high as 20 percent ad valorem), it might be difficult to pass these costs—to compensate for any such duty—onto the consumer.

Editor David J Phillips does not hold financial interests in any of the companies mentioned in this posting. The 10Q Detective has a Full Disclosure policy.

Tuesday, December 26, 2006

Starbucks the Victim of a Coffee Mugging by Oxfam?



Oxfam, a development charity that dates back to World War II, alleges that global coffee retailer Starbucks Corp. (SBUX-$35.38) is depriving Ethiopian coffee farmers of between $88.0 –to- $132.0 million a year, by opposing the Ethiopian government's efforts to trademark three popular varieties of its specialty coffee—Harar, Sidamo and Yirgacheffe beans.

Oxfam and its broad coalition of supporters say:
“More than a year ago, Ethiopia approached Starbucks and asked the company to lead the coffee industry by example and sign an agreement recognizing Ethiopia's legal ownership of its fine coffee names. If companies like Starbucks signed such agreements, Ethiopia would occupy a stronger negotiating position with foreign buyers, capture a larger share of the market associated with its coffee names, and better protect its brands.”

Oxfam and its activists allege that there is a huge disparity in the profit distribution to the players in the coffee industry, with Ethiopian coffee farmers often collecting no more than 10 percent of the profits from the sale of their coffees. The rest goes to the coffee industry players that can control the retail price—the international importers, distributors, and roasters like Starbucks.

Starbucks CEO Jim Donald met with Ethiopia to discuss trademark issues on November 29, 2006. Given little progress in their talks, Oxfam and its supporters organized “The Starbucks Day of Action” –in more than a dozen countries—and demonstrated outside many Starbucks stores on December 16, with activists leafleting and carrying the image of an Ethiopian coffee farmer on sandwich board fronts, with the backside reading, "For every cup of Ethiopian coffee Starbucks sells, Ethiopian farmer earn 3 cents. Tell Starbucks: Honor your commitments to coffee farmers." [Ed. note. Watch the video on YouTube now.]

Talks purportedly broke down because Starbucks favored a geographic certification model—much like Jamaican Blue Mountain Coffee, Florida Orange Juice, and French and Napa Valley Wines—which guarantees a point of origin and standard of quality; whereas, Ethiopia refused, opting for brand ownership.

We laud Oxfam’s good intentions, but question their grasp of Ethiopia’s calculus for peculations.

The rhetoric behind economic development today—especially in African countries—is such that where poverty exists, you can be sure that “corruption” won’t be far behind. Aside from widespread allegations of fraud following the May 2005 parliamentary elections, in which results showed the incumbent Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front retaining a majority, the business environment—while not thought to be as corrupt as political life—in Ethiopia, still ranked only a 3.70 score (with 1.0 being the best & 5.0 being the worst) on an
”Index of Economic Freedom 2006” census taken by The Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal: “Ethiopia's cumbersome bureaucracy deters investment…. Corruption in Ethiopia poses various problems for [the] business environment, as patronage networks are firmly entrenched and political clout is often used to gain economic prowess."

In our view, irrespective of going the certification process or the intellectual property route, in order for the coffee farmers to share in any incremental value—such as an increase in annual income—necessitates a transparent system that shows how the money is going back to the farmers.

In addition to failing to explain what type of transparent ‘checks and balances’ system need be established, nowhere in its press releases does Oxfam explain how the agency derived the incremental annual benefit to farmers of between $88.0 –to- $132.0 million.

To the contrary, since 2001, Starbucks has been inserting transparency into standard contracts. Today, the Company has
economic transparency requirements for 59 percent of all coffee purchased to provide information on the payments made to farmers. This represents 177 million lbs. (80 million kg.) of coffee.

In December 22, 2006,
Starbucks Letter to the Editor of the Seattle Post Intelligencer (regarding the Ethiopian Trademark), Dub Hay, VP-Global Coffee Procurement said, too: “While our purchases of Ethiopian coffee represent a very small percentage of the country’s total coffee exports, we pay premium prices – in 2005 our price exceeded the New York commodity market price by 23 percent -- for all of the coffee we buy in 27 countries. And, between 2002 and 2006 we increased purchases of Ethiopian coffee by more than 400 percent and are committed to growing those purchases in the years to come.”

In our view Oxfam and its supporters have not presented a cogent argument to suggest that Starbucks is acting in an unethical or socially irresponsible manner; nor has Oxfam presented any convincing evidence that Starbucks is willfully trying to maximize its own profit margins—by denying Ethiopian farmers their legitimate coffee profits.

Voir dire [Old French: “To speak the truth”] is a tool used to achieve the constitutional right to an impartial jury. Preliminary examination of Oxfam as an impartial juror would show that the aid agency is in an awkward position to comment on the social responsibility of Starbucks:
  1. Language found in a Coffee (Rescue Plan) Policy paper [2002] speaks volumes: “Despite the stagnant consumer market, the coffee companies are laughing all the way to the bank…. Until now, rich consumer countries and the huge companies based in them responded to the crises [slump in coffee prices and economic impact on coffee farmers] with inexcusable complacency. In the face of human misery, there have been many words yet little action.”
  2. In 2004, Oxfam accepted a £100,000 investment by Starbucks into a rural coffee-growing project in Ethiopia and a range of expertise-sharing programs focusing on improving trading agreements for millions of coffee farmers in developing countries.

Given the weaknesses of Oxfam’s arguments and its lapses in credibility, Starbucks comes across less as a coffee-thirsty exploiter of less-developed countries, and more the victim of a coffee mugging.

Editor David J Phillips does not hold financial interests in any of the companies mentioned in this posting. The 10Q Detective has a Full Disclosure policy.

Wednesday, December 20, 2006

Delta Air Lines + Scripophily = $1.38 per share


Delta Air Lines Inc. (DALRQ-$1.38) announced today that its Board of Directors, with the full support of the Company’s management team, formally rejected the unsolicited $8.6 billion bid by rival U.S. Airways Group (LCC-$57.50) and publicly presented its own reorganization proposal.

The Board concluded that Delta’s
stand-alone plan would provide the Company’s creditors with superior value and greater certainty on a much faster timetable.

In a valuation analysis prepared by Delta’s financial advisor, The Blackstone Group, creditors would retain consolidated equity worth between $9.4 billion to $12.0 billion. These values would result in a recovery for Delta’s unsecured creditors of about 63 cents to 80 cents of each dollar in their allowed claims (via distributions of new Delta common stock).

In addition, the Company said that the
U.S. Airways proposal was structurally flawed and could not be executed as claimed by U.S. Airways because of erroneous economic assumptions, higher debt-loads (needed to fund the merger), and, labor and antitrust issues. Insurmountable hurdles to the U.S. Airways deal include, but are not limited to the following:

  1. The flawed economic assumptions underpinning the “synergies” in the US Airways proposal would result in vastly lower value than claimed by US Airways.
  2. The combined company would have the highest total debt load in the airline industry -approximately $23 billion - seriously limiting its financial flexibility and ability to withstand the volatility of the airline industry (and would force the new entity to cut some 10,000 jobs).
  3. There are overwhelming labor issues that would preclude the combination from attaining the claimed synergies. The Delta unit of the Air Line Pilots Association, the union representing Delta’s more than 6,000 pilots, has said - and Delta agrees - that Delta’s pilot contract (which runs from June 1,2006 – December 31, 2009) would prohibit the combined company from implementing capacity reductions that US Airways asserts are the economic foundation of the proposed transaction.
  4. The transaction is not likely to receive antitrust clearance from regulators because it would result in loss of competition, thereby, negatively impacting consumers and their communities: (i) The proposed merger would eliminate or reduce competition on thousands of domestic city pairs (origin and destination cities/airports), impacting millions of passengers per year; (ii) the combined entity would operate 52% of slots and 40% of gates at major East Coast airports; (iii) there would be no competitive low cost carrier presence (> 5% passenger share) at any of the 71 U.S. cities dominated by the merger; (iv) and, the deal would substantially reduce competition at Boston-Logan, New York-LaGuardia, and Washington-Reagan National airports (share position analysis based on passenger traffic); Ergo, city pair concentration and route dominance would lead to reduced competition, fewer discounted seats, and higher passenger fare levels—subjecting the US Airways proposal to a lengthy Department of Justice review process, during which Delta would be forced to remain in bankruptcy.

As of September 30, 2006, $20.9 billion in contractual obligations subject to compromise weighed on Delta’s balance sheet. Under the priority scheme established by the Bankruptcy Code, the ultimate recovery to shareowners is the last priority to recover (what is left in assets) after all creditors are satisfied under the filed plan or of reorganization. Given that the total shareholder deficit of Delta is approximately $13.9 billion—or about $(68.90) per share—the future giveback to shareholders does not look promising.

The Company intends to emerge from Chapter 11 in the spring of 2007. The Board of Directors have suggested that when the Company emerges from bankruptcy and issues new equity for its creditors that it will cancel its outstanding common stock currently trading.

The market price of a stock reflects what buyers are willing to pay—based on their evaluation of the Company’s value, cash flows, and future prospects.
Is it rational behavior for investors to pay $1.38 per share for worthless paper?

Might common stock owners might be speculating that the Bankruptcy court and/or Creditors Committee denies the current Debtor petition?—a history of reorganizations provides evidence contrary to this position.

We broached this question once before—in our November 8, 2006, posting on
Delphi Corp.

This second go-around, we are going to introduce a new supposition:
scripophily (pronounced scri-POPH-i-ly), which is the collecting of old stock and bond certificates. Values range from a few dollars to more than $100,000 (for the rarest).

Scripophily.com, the Internet's largest buyer and seller of collectible stock and bond certificates, grew sales 31 percent during the past 12 months ending October 31, 2006, compared with the prior year. CEO and Founder Bob Kerstein: “The increase in activity is primarily due to interest in the historical significance and beauty of stock and bond certificates as well as their relative scarcity.

Physical stock and bond certificates are a permanent history of capitalism representing a cross section of the financial markets we know today. Stock certificates are becoming an artifact of the past as the world becomes more digitized."

The supply of new certificates reaching the collector market has been substantially reduced due to recent changes in State Laws and Stock Exchanges Rules. Many companies are no longer required to issue physical stock and bond certificates.

As previously mentioned, come spring 2007, the existing stock will have no redeemable value, save as a collectable.
Might investors be scooping up Delta stock in hopes of profiting from the potential value of the underlying certificates to hobby enthusiasts?

Looking through Scripophily.com’s online inventory, extant certificates of Allegheny Airlines (in 1979 it became US Air), Air Florida Systems (folded in July 1984), American West Airlines (operated in bankruptcy from 1991 to 1994), and Braniff Airways (filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy on June 1, 1982) were recently priced for sale at $139.95, $79.95, $99.95, and $79.95, respectively.

There are many factors that determine value of a certificate including condition, age, historical significance, signatures, rarity, demand for item, aesthetics, type of company, original face value, bankers associated with issuance, transfer stamps, cancellation markings, issued or unissued, printers, and type of engraving process.

“Delta is ready when you are.” –Advertising slogan. Maybe—But we are skeptical that Scripophily.com is ready to buy thousands of soon-to-be worthless Delta stock certificates.

Editor David J Phillips does not hold financial interests in any of the companies mentioned in this posting. The 10Q Detective has a Full Disclosure policy.

Monday, December 18, 2006

How many WorldComs in Your Future? -- Shame on You, Chris Cox!



Essayist and philosopher George Santayana knew too well the nature of men when he first wrote the now banal words, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

Save for shareholder activists, those in academia, and the usual politicians pandering for votes—the 10Q Detective foresaw back in 2002 that the S.E.C never had the conviction to hold back the tide of the better-financed business lobbyists— Sarbanes-Oxley had a limited shelf life.

Responding to criticism that regulators had overreacted to years of corporate scandals—WorldCom, Adelphia, Enron, Tyco, to name a few—the
S.E.C. took its first steps to ease regulations on businesses.

Hidden among a flurry of deregulatory orders and proposals issued last week to “lower costs to public companies,” were proposals submitted to enfeeble the enforcement of existing disclosure and financial reporting rules. Specifically, the S.E.C. acquiesced to businesses demands by proposing that small capitalization companies be given back some control in restricting their auditors from engaging in what the executives “viewed as expensive and unnecessary audits” of financial activities that had “minimum impact on financial statements” (Section 404).

We ask our readers to indulge us—read some bullet points lifted from the recent Proxy Statement of Global ePoint (GEPT-$0.52), a manufacturer of digital surveillance and detection solutions—and, then see if you agree with S.E.C. Chairman Christopher Cox when he said last week that looser interpretation of existing auditing rules would not reduce investor protection:

Related Parties Transactions

  • Global transacts a substantial majority of its business with companies that are owned or controlled by Mr. John Pan, Chairman, President, Chief Financial Officer and largest stockholder, who beneficially owns 4.95 million shares, or almost 25 percent of the common stock. According to Global, “these transactions allow the Company to leverage sales opportunities and component and sub-system purchasing relationships of these related companies.”

Management believes that Global can achieve the benefits of economies of scale associated with shared facilities, administration, and sales, and the benefits associated with the use of the related parties’ network of global contacts, sales opportunities and purchasing power.

Facilities Leasing Arrangement

  • Global shares office and warehouse facilities in buildings owned or controlled by Mr. John Pan, which facilities are also partially occupied by another company controlled by Mr. Pan. Global also uses and pays rent to Mr. Pan for the use of its manufacturing and assembly equipment. Global recorded occupancy costs and equipment rental expenses to Mr. Pan totaling $519,000 and $492,000 for the fiscal years ended December 31, 2005 and 2004, respectively. Occupancy costs paid to Mr. Pan were based on the square footage occupied and a price per square foot verbally agreed upon.

Sale Arrangements

  • During 2005 and 2004, Global sold approximately $18.0 and $7.6 million, respectively, of products and contract manufacturing services to related parties. Included in these amounts were sales of $17.6 and $7.2 million, respectively, to Avatar Technology Inc. and $0.2 and $0.3 million, respectively, to Prophecy Technology LLC. This represented 55% and 36% of overall sales for the year ended December 31, 2005 and 2004, respectively.

Avatar provides distribution of computer components around the world, as well as consumer PCs in selected markets. In both 2005 and 2004, Avatar secured major contracts for consumer PCs with a large retail chain in Latin America and, as a result, subcontracted the manufacturing of the consumer PCs to us. Global’s contract manufacturing division generated sales of approximately $17.6 and $7.2 million in 2005 and 2004, respectively, from Avatar for consumer PCs, all of which were ultimately delivered to retail stores of Avatar’s customers throughout Latin America.

Prior to joining Global ePoint in August 2003, Mr. Pan was the founder, Chief Financial Officer, President, and a director of Avatar Technology, Inc., and he remains a consultant to that company.

Mr. Pan is also a founder, President and Chief Financial Officer of Prophecy Technology LLC, positions he has held since September 1992.

Purchases From Related Parties

  • During 2005 and 2004, Global purchased from related parties components and finished products totaling approximately $15.3 and $5.7 million, respectively. According to management, “The related parties can generally purchase components in greater quantity than Global can on its own and thereby can pass through to the Company the more favorable pricing due to its volume discounts.” Of total purchases from related parties, a majority constituted purchases of various component parts, such as memory, CPUs, hard drives and motherboards, and finished products from Avatar and Prophecy. Of the total purchases in 2005 and 2004, approximately $10.8 and $1.7 million, respectively, were from Avatar, and approximately $4.4 and $4 million, respectively, were from Prophecy. These aggregate costs represented about 53% and 35% of overall cost of goods for the year ended December 31, 2005 and 2004, respectively.

Other Related Party Transactions

  • In June 2004, Global borrowed $1.0 million from John Pan. The aggregate interest rate was 7.25% as of December 31, 2005; the outstanding loan and accrued interest totaled $1.1 million. Global is required to accrue interest payments each month until the principal balance is paid in full, which must occur no later than December 2006.
  • In addition to being the largest customer of and supplier to Global, Mr. Pan is also paid an annual wage in his role as Chairman, Chief Financial Officer and President of Global. In fiscal year 2005, his salary was increased approximately 20 percent to $245,000, plus an annual bonus of up $147,000 (based on Mr. Pan’s satisfaction of annual performance conditions to be determined by the Compensation Committee).

In our view, Global ePoint epitomizes how weakening the internal auditing control at small capitalization companies does a potential disservice to investors.

The past is history; The future is a mystery – Allan Johnson

The future for investors of small cap companies is no mystery to us—more corporate fraud.

The 10Q Detective is not alleging that Global ePoint, a provider of vending machines for the sale of instant-winner lottery tickets in a former life, was—or is—guilty of any fraud or corporate abuses.

Weakening internal control systems and lowering the bar for financial reporting standards does little to promote corporate transparency. Christopher Cox and the S.E.C.—shame on you!

Editor David J. Phillips holds no financial interest in any of the stocks mentioned in this article. The 10Q Detective has a full disclosure policy.

Friday, December 15, 2006

Early Christmas Bonuses for Ashland's Board of Directors



In the last two years, specialty chemicals distributor Ashland Inc. (ASH-$68.86) has sold two subsidiaries for an aggregate balance of about $5.0 billion.

“Capital as such is not evil; it is its wrong use that is evil. Capital in some form or other will always be needed.” – Mohandas Gandhi

Unfortunately, Ashland has displayed both fiscal prudence and exacting pretense for using the $5.0 billion to remake itself as a global player in the chemical and adhesives material markets.

On June 30, 2005, Ashland transferred its 38% interest in Marathon Ashland Petroleum LLC (MAP) to Marathon Oil Corp. for the consideration of $3.7 billion in cash and stock.

Ashland used a substantial portion of the proceeds of the MAP Transaction to strengthen its balance sheet, retiring most of its debt and certain other financial obligations. In addition to the repurchase of accounts receivable previously sold under its sale of receivables facility and the purchase of $101 million of assets that were formerly rented under operating leases, Ashland retired approximately $1.6 billion of balance sheet debt as of September 30, 2005 (incurring a loss on the early retirement of debt—repayment premium penalties and issuance fees—of $145 million).

During 2006, Ashland continued with its focus to redefine itself as more than the owner of the automotive lubricant, Valvoline, a branded motor oil (and other appearance products, including antifreeze, filters and automotive fragrances).

On August 28, 2006, Ashland sold its paving and construction business (APAC) to Old Castle Materials, Inc. for $1.3 billion. [Ed. note. Prior to the sale of APAC, the subsidiary was producing about 30 percent of the Company’s annual revenue.]

Shareholders were rewarded by this sale when the Company declared a special cash dividend of $10.20 per share, which was payable on October. 25,2006.

Even with the cash distributions to shareholders, management said that money left over from the sale of the paving business and other businesses would enable it to make more than $2 billion in purchases—including up to 7.0 million in share buybacks—without increasing debt beyond two times its earnings before taxes.

[Ed. note. For the fiscal year ended September 30, 2006, EBITDA was about $220.0 million.]

Ashland repurchased 6.7 million shares for $405 million during fiscal year 2006. Following the completion of the current share repurchase program Ashland estimates it will have purchased approximately 18% of the shares outstanding on June 30, 2005. [Ed. note. The stock repurchase actions are consistent with certain representations of intent made to the Internal Revenue Service with respect to the transfer of MAP.]

Last month, in keeping with its promise to promote growth, the Company signed an agreement to purchase Northwest Coatings, cutting-edge adhesives and coatings company that uses ultraviolet and electron beam technology, for $72 million.

Unfortunately, we did the math—followed the money trail—and could not find the $2.0 billion that the Company said was available for future purchases:

1. Saying that cash inflows to the Company were $5.0 billion would be misleading; the MAP transaction only resulted in a non-taxable gain to Ashland of about $1.29 billion and Ashland recorded an after-tax gain on the sale of APAC of $110 million in 2006.
2. $1.40 billion (revised cash inflows) - $1.60 billion (debt retirement) - $674.0 million (special cash dividends) - $405.0 million (2006 share repurchase program) - $100.0 million (additional share repurchases in 2H:05) - $101.0 million (proceeds from the MAP Transaction to purchase Construction Equipment assets) = $(1.48) billion deficit
3. OOPS! Less $72.0 million (for the Northwest Coatings acquisition) = $(1.55) billion deficit. Five Billion just doesn’t buy what it used to?

Valuation Analysis

The common stock of Ashland has climbed 21.08% in the past 52-weeks, as investors anticipate that the recent sale of the pavement and construction business represents an important strategic step in transforming the Company into a diversified chemical company, better positioned to benefit from continued global economic growth (especially in Europe and China).

[Ed. note. Now that the monies from the two subsidiaries have been spent, any future acquisitions will have to come from borrowings. Albeit we do admit that the company does sit in good financial health, with about $33.75 per share in cash and a Total-Debt/Equity ratio of only 2.6 percent.]

In our view, the rise in the price of Ashland’s stock already reflects an optimistic scenario. Long-term, we remain (fundamentally) unimpressed with a company generating a ROA and a ROE of 1.59% and 5.36%, respectively.

Corporate Governance Issues

As we demonstrated earlier, Ashland forgot to turn off the money spigot.

To further illustrate our point:

Pursuant to Ashland’s 2005 incentive plans, upon election to the Board of Directors, a new director received 1,000 restricted shares of Ashland Common Stock. Each director received, too, an annual retainer of $65,000 (for attending nine meetings of the Board of Directors).

In addition to the annual retainer, non-employee directors received $1,500 for each Board of Directors and Committee meeting attended. The Lead Independent Director also received three $5,000 quarterly installments of a $20,000 annual fee approved by the Governance Committee in January 2006. The Committee Chairs also received a $5,000 annual fee. Members of the Audit Committee, including the Chairman, also received a $1,500 fee for attendance at each quarterly Audit Committee financial review with Ashland’s management. All such fees could be paid in cash, shares of Ashland Common Stock or deferred into any investment alternative available under the Directors’ Deferral Plan.

Flush—with what they thought—were all these new billions in the Company’s coffer—the directors voted to themselves more than a 38 percent raise in their annual retainer. Effective January 26, 2007, the revised compensation program provides that non-employee directors will receive (a) an annual retainer of $90,000; (b) an additional annual retainer of $20,000 for the Lead Independent Director; (c) an additional annual retainer of $15,000 for the Chair of the Audit Committee and $7,500 for Audit Committee members; and (d) an additional annual retainer of $7,500 for other Committee Chairs.

In addition, pursuant to the revised non-employee director compensation program, effective January 26, 2007, each director will receive an annual award of deferred restricted stock units with a grant date value of $100,000! The restricted stock units will vest one year after date of grant and will be payable in stock or cash, at the director’s election upon termination of service. Under the revised director compensation program, however, annual stock option grants will no longer be made to non-employee directors.

Truth or dare—Do any investors truly believe that this new compensation package for non-employee directors will “create a stronger linkage and alignment with the long-term interests of Ashland and its shareholders?”

By contrast, CEO James J O’Brien received a base increase of only 10.8%, or $95,000, (to $983,258), during fiscal 2006. Lest we forget, however, Messer. O’Brien, was awarded a bonus of $1.16 million for fiscal 2006—and a long-term compensation payout of $1.29 million (representing fiscal years 2004 – 2006).

[Ed. note. In fiscal 2005, Ashland settled a shareholder derivative lawsuit brought in 2002. In settling the action, Ashland agreed, among other things, to solicit from its major shareholders director candidates and to nominate a qualified candidate for election to the Board of Directors.]

Certain Relationships and Transactions

Mannie L. Jackson, a director of Ashland, is Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Harlem Globetrotters. During fiscal 2006, Ashland paid the Harlem Globetrotters approximately $31,000 for certain promotional tie-ins.

Michael J. Ward, a director of Ashland, is Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of CSX Corporation (“CSX”). In fiscal 2006, Ashland paid CSX and its subsidiaries approximately $13.6 million for transportation services, and CSX paid Ashland approximately $114,000 for certain products and/or services.

Investment Risks and Considerations

Many of Ashland’s businesses are cyclical in nature and economic downturns or declines in demand may negatively impact the Company’s financial performance. The profitability of Ashland is susceptible to downturns in the economy, particularly in those segments related to durable goods, including the housing, construction, automotive, and marine industries. Both overall demand for Ashland's products and services and its profitability will likely change as a direct result of an economic recession, inflation, changes in hydrocarbon (and its derivatives) and other raw materials prices, or changes in governmental monetary or fiscal policies.

Ashland has been undergoing a major process initiative designed to optimize its supply chain function. By integrating the supply chain function and creating more efficient, customer responsive processes including source-to-pay, plan-to-deliver and order-to-cash, Ashland is looking to lower costs, while increasing service levels and customer satisfaction. The implementation of the Supply Chain Optimization Project carries substantial risk, including the potential for business interruption and associated adverse impacts on operating results.

Editor David J Phillips does not hold financial interests in any of the companies mentioned in this posting. The 10Q Detective has a Full Disclosure policy.